Where is caporetto

Austria-Hungary appealed to Germany for help. In response, Germany sent six divisions, grouped with nine Austro-Hungarian divisions into the Fourteenth Army commanded by the German general, Otto von Below, and planning began for an assault against the Italians.

Skip to main content. This service is more advanced with JavaScript available. Advertisement Hide. After the bombing, the infantry advance began, composed of well-rested men, not tired and weary like the Italian soldiers.

The weather, characterized by a heavy fog that made visibility difficult for the defense troops, facilitated the assault, but it was the infiltration tactic which allowed the Austro-Germans to conquer the Italian trenches. The troops did not attack in compact groups but rather in small platoons: they were agile and independent, penetrated the enemy ranks and infiltrated deep behind the lines, taking the Italians by surprise from behind.

The Austro-German troops quickly reached the mountain range dominating the plain of Friuli region and assumed a dominant position from which they threatened most of the Italian backline deployed east of Isonzo. The attackers in the valley marched almost unopposed; some advanced a remarkable twenty-five kilometers during the first day.

With the penetration of the enemy and the disruption of communications, the Italian troops began to fall apart.

The soldiers without serious injuries began to form an enormous river of people, seemingly without a destination, which is still one of the symbols of the battle. The news about the breakup of the front between Plezzo and Tolmino, toward Caporetto, arrived at the Supreme Command in the afternoon of 24 October The Austro-German surprise was therefore total.

For the Italians, the situation was aggravated by the failure to establish and train reserve troops and by the absence of a defined plan for a possible retreat. He also ordered the immediate evacuation of the Carnia and Cadore areas: 1. On 27 October , the commander of the Italian army issued a report accusing the Second Army of surrendering to the enemy without fighting.

On 27 October , the Austro-German troops had already arrived in Cividale; the following day they conquered Udine and on 29 October they had almost reached the Tagliamento River. When the troops reached the river, the Italian Third Army had already crossed it or was about to do so. Advancing more deeply into the territory was impossible; the Italian defeat was such that even the attackers were surprised and did not have the forces to fully exploit the success.

In the end, Berlin asked to relocate the mobilized men and material — even these troops were unprepared for so sudden a change from trench warfare to a movement war. At the end of the offensive, the Italian army counted 11, dead , 29, wounded, , prisoners and about another , scattered men. On the Austro-German side, the losses were around 50, men killed or wounded. Italian troops were positioned on the Piave where they resisted and reorganized, since here they could establish a new defensive line.

After the defeat of Caporetto, the Allies sent troops to support the Italian army that was laboriously rearranging itself. They were reinforced by six French and five British infantry divisions. Prior to the battle, in mid-October , the new Italian government was formed, headed by Vittorio Emanuele Orlando Although this decision had been made before the defeat of Caporetto, its execution was suspended after the battle in order to not complicate the operations of the withdrawn troops.

The task was entrusted to General Armando Diaz , who served until and was nominated Duke of Victory at the end of the conflict. Grillini, Anna: Caporetto, Battle of , in: online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. The front line would remain in this position until the final weeks of the war.

In addition to the hundreds of thousands of prisoners and dispersed soldiers, the Italian army also lost 40, soldiers who were either killed or wounded during the battle. German and Austro-Hungarian casualties numbered 50, Over one million civilian refugees had been forced to flee from the advancing Austro-German troops; many more remained trapped in occupied territory, suffering death, sickness and deprivation under Habsburg military rule.

The Italians also lost significant stores of clothing and bedding: , coats and waterproofs, 69, hats, , pairs of boots and 1. Engineers lost more than 17, tonnes of essential material, while thousands of trucks and tens of thousands of horses and mules — with their fodder — were abandoned to the enemy. Some 3, artillery pieces and a similar number of machine guns were lost, which Italy could ill afford given its shortages of these essential weapons.

Several field hospitals with all their beds, iodine and medicines were taken. The loss of significant amounts of coal meant that Italy became dependent on imports from its allies. The consequences of the defeat were dramatic and a great deal of national soul-searching followed with immediate changes at the highest levels. The prime minister, Paolo Boselli, was replaced by the experienced liberal lawyer Vittorio Orlando.

Cadorna was forced out. His high-handed, inflexible leadership was unpopular with civilian politicians and his military abilities had been questioned even before the catastrophic events of Caporetto. Orlando did not want to work with him and nor did the Allies, whose representatives arrived in Italy at the end of October.

The allies met at Rapallo, near Genoa, on 5 November, with the battle still raging. Where Cadorna had stifled initiative and confidence — sacking and demoting commanders at the drop of a hat — Diaz was more open to suggestions and to delegation. Concerns about disaffection and defeatism among the troops had been growing. Cadorna was quick to advance this interpretation. In truth, it is unfair to claim that the frontline units who faced the Austro-German assault on 24 October or the days after failed to fight.

Many reports suggest that the men fought bravely with determination for as long as they had officers and munitions. Once these two essentials were lost it was hard to keep a positive outlook, as a battalion commander from the th infantry regiment recalled:.

On the night of 23 October my men were in good spirits but by the end of the next day they were less confident. By the end of 25 October, the unit had become mixed with others, the men had not slept for 24 hours and had no more munitions. Under these circumstances large groups of men could be captured by small enemy detachments.

Cadorna had decided to hold the mountainous peaks at all costs while neglecting the valleys below; the Germans simply advanced with speed through these valleys, encircling the defenders on the peaks. Caporetto was a devastating military defeat, but it was one with clearly identifiable strategic, operational and tactical causes.

The battle almost immediately assumed the name of the town where the decisive breakthrough had been made and soon became an emblem of Italian military failure. For decades it was associated with anti-war sentiment, desertion and cowardice. In a sense, the whole country reacted this way. Yet the scars left by Caporetto were hard to heal. The shadows of those foggy, chaotic days in the mountains loomed large into the postwar years. Vanda Wilcox Published 24 Oct Pisani later described his task in his official post-battle debriefing: There was total confusion, the road was almost entirely blocked by a mass of troops, carts, horses, trucks, artillery pieces, mules, and supplies.

Pisani described the scene: There was no immediate command in the town of Caporetto itself. Once these two essentials were lost it was hard to keep a positive outlook, as a battalion commander from the th infantry regiment recalled: On the night of 23 October my men were in good spirits but by the end of the next day they were less confident.

First World War.